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ABSTRACT 
Privacy and security are paramount for the proper deployment of location-based services (LBSs). We present a novel 
protocol based on user collaboration to privately retrieve location-based information from an LBS provider. Our approach 
neither assumes that users or the LBS can be completely trusted with regard to privacy, nor relies on a trusted third party. 
In addition, user queries, containing accurate locations, remain unchanged, and the collaborative protocol does not 
impose any special requirements on the query-response function of the LBS. The protocol is analyzed in terms of privacy, 
network traffic, and LBS processing overhead. We show that our proposal provides exponential scalability in the 
probability of guaranteed privacy breach, at the expense of a linear relative network cost. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The opening up of enormous business opportunities for location-based services (LBSs) is a result of the 
recent advances in wireless communications and positioning technologies. 3G technology makes mobile 
wireless communications faster than ever, and highly accurate positioning devices using GPS technology are 
widely accessible to the general public [7]. Due to the massive use of these technologies [2], an 
unprecedented amount of data is fleetingly traveling through high-speed networks from all over the world. 
Some of these data refer to users' private information such as their locations and preferences, and it should be 
handled carefully. The improper management of users' private data is a matter of considerable public concern 
and it could decelerate the deployment of LBSs. Location privacy and users' security are of paramount 
importance. If privacy and security issues are guaranteed, LBSs will become one of the most important 
representatives of the information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the 21
st
 century. 
The way LBSs are accessed by users is changing rapidly. The simplest form of information exchange in 
an LBS involves a user and an LBS provider P. The former sends a simple query Q containing some sort of 
identification information ID, their location L and a request for information I that the user wants to retrieve 
from P. Thus, a simple query sent from U to P may be Q ={IDU, L,I}={IDU,xU, yU, ―Where is the nearest 
Italian restaurant?‖}. Fig. 1 depicts this communication scheme. 
 
Fig. 1. Simple communication scheme between an LBS user and an LBS provider. 
When users send their current locations to the LBS, they are not always guaranteed that the LBS will 
manage their data honestly and will refrain from any misuse. Consequently, more sophisticated mechanisms 
for location-based information retrieval are needed, which must protect the users' privacy. Most of the 
solutions proposed in the literature to address the LBS privacy problem are based on trusted third parties 
(TTPs), i.e., entities which fully guarantee the privacy of their users. Although this approach is widely 
accepted, it simply moves users' trust from LBS providers to intermediate entities. By doing so, LBS 
providers are no longer aware of the real locations and identities of their users; trust, and by extension power 
are handed over to intermediate entities such as psedonymizers and anonymizers. The problem is that users 
are not necessarily satisfied about completely trusting intermediate entities or providers, especially after the 
recent scandals related to the disclosure of personal data by this kind of trusted entities. See Fig. 2 for a 
graphical representation of TTP-based schemes. 
 
Fig. 2. Communication scheme between an LBS user, an intermediate trusted entity and an LBS provider. 
The main difference between the simple communication scheme depicted in Fig.1 and the TTP-based one 
[6,14] is that in the latter the set of intermediate entities can be expected to be smaller than the number of 
service providers. Therefore, intermediate entities can be well known and the risk of trusting a dishonest 
entity is reduced. Pseudonymizers are the simplest intermediate entity between LBS users and providers. 
Anonymizers [1,10,13,14] are the most sophisticated option in TTP-based location privacy. However, many 
users would prefer to trust nobody and, consequently, TTP-free schemes [3,4,5,11,12] enter the arena. These 
represent a substantial change of paradigm. See Fig. 3 for a graphical representation of a TTP-free scheme. 
Instead of trusting a third party, users collaborate to protect their privacy. Moreover, there is no need to trust 
the users one collaborates with.  
 
Fig. 3. Communication scheme between a set of collaborative LBS users and an untrusted LBS provider. Location 
information may not be the real one (L), but a perturbed one (L’). No TTP is used. 
1.1 Contribution and plan 
In this paper, we present a novel approach to privately retrieve location-based information from an 
untrusted LBS provider. Our method does not rely on TTPs but on the collaboration among multiple users to 
achieve privacy, despite the fact that users may not be completely trusted. Instead of defining common 
cloaking areas into which users become anonymous or sharing a perturbed bogus location, our method mixes 
queries from many users and prevents LBS providers from knowing which query refers to user. One of the 
main strengths of the protocol is that it benefits from an exponentially decreasing probability of guaranteed 
privacy breach, at the expense of only linearly increasing relative communication costs, with respect to the 
size parameters of the trellis. We provide a theoretical analysis of the probability of coincidental privacy 
breach. Furthermore, we carry out Monte Carlo simulations to verify the theoretical results and to investigate 
policy modifications of our protocol. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 presents our protocol for private, TTP-free, location-
based information retrieval through user collaboration. The theoretical analysis of this protocol in terms of 
privacy is developed in Sec. 3 while the Monte Carlo simulation analysis is developed in Sec. 4. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in Sec. 5. 
2. A COLLABORATIVE PROTOCOL FOR PRIVACY IN LBSS 
In this section we present a collaborative protocol that enables a number of users to interact with an LBS in a 
way that protects the privacy of their queries and replies. This is achieved in spite of two assumptions. First, 
it is assumed that neither the LBS nor other cooperating users can be completely trusted regarding the 
disclosure or a user's private information. Secondly, both the queries and the replies contain accurate 
information that may not be perturbed. Sec 2.1 makes our assumptions more precise. The privacy protocol 
proposed is described in Sec. 2.2, which relies on the existence of a cooperative structure of users. 
2.1 Assumptions 
In the following, we describe the assumptions on which our collaborative privacy protocol has been built: 
 Users are allowed to cooperate but no party can be completely trusted, thus no TTP is available. 
 Queries sent to the LBS must be kept private and accurate, thus they may not be perturbed. In particular, 
noise may not be added to the users' accurate location information to protect their privacy.  
 The privacy protocol must be completely transparent to an arbitrary query-response function 
implemented by the LBS. This prevents, for instance, the use of cryptographic mechanisms operating on 
the assumption of a reduced response space, or a lookup table implementation of the query-response 
function. 
 Knowledge of the user ID is inherent to the communication system, and no form of anonymization is 
possible, through a TTP or otherwise. IDs may neither be shared nor exchanged among users. 
 Communication between any two parties is confidential and authenticated. 
 Messages exchanged between users may be encrypted for the LBS to further strengthen confidentiality. 
In practice, this would require that the LBS participate in any collusion against a user's privacy. 
Clearly, the last two hypotheses may be satisfied by the existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI), not 
necessarily online. The very last requirement, in particular, could be fulfilled by encrypting messages with 
the public key of the LBS.  
Finally, we shall assume the existence of a secure mechanism by means of which users may organize 
themselves and adhere to a privacy protocol involving certain message exchanges. Particularly, we shall 
assume that there is a way to create and efficiently maintain collaborative structures, which is robust against 
denial-of-service attacks.  
The creation and maintenance of the trellis structure is detailed in [9]. Creating and maintaining the ad 
hoc network structure needed for our protocol has been shown to be feasible with a small number of nodes. 
This may be sufficient in practical applications because our proposal does not need a large number of 
participants, due to the exponentially low likelihood of privacy breach. However, an interesting challenge 
arises from the fact that the protocol may be improved by devising a completely secure and more efficient 
mechanism to create and maintain collaborative structures, and to enforce the privacy protocol presented, in 
particular against denial of service attacks, and for large-scale structures [8]. 
We shall see that the LBS receives a list of queries, some of them forged, together with a list of subscriber 
IDs. This allows billing systems based either on flat fees or on the number of queries submitted, while 
preventing billing based on privacy-sensitive properties such as query length. 
2.2 Query Permutation on a Trellis of Users  
Consider first the simplest case when a single user must access an LBS. One way to ensure that the LBS is 
unable to completely ascertain the user's actual information interests is for the user to accompany his queries 
with forged ones. Unfortunately, this may represent a significant overhead in terms of network traffic and 
LBS processing. 
To preserve privacy at a reasonable network and LBS processing cost, we propose the following protocol, 
based on query permutation in a trellis of users. More specifically, users form a trellis of m rows and n 
columns as shown in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig.4. Query permutation on a trellis of users. 
In this setting, only users in the first column generate forged queries and send them along with their 
authentic queries to users in the second column. In general, as illustrated in Fig. 5, user (i,j) in row i and 
column j receives permuted queries from users in column j-1 when j>1, or forges queries when j=1. Next, the 
user adds their own query, permutes the resulting list, and finally, splits it and sends each part to different 
users in the following column j+1 if j<n, or to the LBS if j=n. The choices regarding the permutation of the 
list, its splitting, and the users the parts are sent to, may be random. 
 
Fig.5. User (i,j) adds their own query to those received from the previous column, permutes the resulting list, splits it and 
sends the parts to users in the next column. 
For 1<j<n, in order to guarantee that the privacy of user (i,j) be completely compromised regardless of 
how queries are split and transmitted, it seems that 2m users, namely all users from the previous column and 
the next one, must collude. However, m+1 users are enough if we are satisfied with the coincidental 
configuration where all users in column j-1 collude with the user in column j+1 which happened to receive 
the query.  
2.3 Query forwarding policies  
Intuition suggests that the random query forwarding policy may be improved by enforcing maximum 
diffusion of queries from a user to the column of recipients. For example, if (i,j) has at least m queries, 
sending at least one to each of the users in j+1 may have a positive impact in terms of probability of privacy 
breach. We shall see this is the case in the experiments reported in section 4. Such policy guarantees that 
nodes in j+1 do not need to generate forged queries to protect their privacy against users in j+2. On the other 
hand, nodes in the first column would still need to forge m-1 queries each, to enforce this throughout the 
trellis. 
More generally, it is possible to carry out the protocol described in this section in slightly different ways, 
with consequent variations in performance in terms of privacy and number of messages. For example, for 
1<j<n, user (i,j) could split its own query into portions sent to all users in column j+1. In this way, a single 
malicious user in the next column does not suffice for a complete privacy breach. These portions should be 
properly tagged in order for the LBS to recombine them. However, if all users in column j+1 are malicious, 
they could keep track of the recombination tags to discard incomplete groups of query portions coming from 
(i,j), in order to compromise the user's privacy. At the other extreme, an alternative to reduce the number of 
messages would consist in sending the entire query list to a single, randomly chosen user from the next 
column.  
3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY AND COST 
In this section we analyze the trellis structure described in Sec. 2.2 in terms of two contrasting aspects. On 
the one hand, we consider the usefulness of this structure to preserve the users' privacy and carry out 
simulations for two simple policies. On the other, we study the overhead cost in regard to network 
connections, traffic and LBS processing. 
3.1 Privacy 
Interested in a conceptual, preliminary analysis, we shall simply assume that users disclose their lists of 
queries and are willing to collude with other users to compromise a given user's privacy, with identical 
probability 1-t, independently from each other, conditioned on the event that the LBS is willing to act 
maliciously as well. Loosely speaking, t is the probability that a user can be trusted, given that the LBS 
cannot. Conditioning on the event that the LBS is malicious makes the computation identical regardless of 
whether queries are encrypted for the LBS, and yields slightly simpler expressions,  omitting a constant 
factor, namely the probability that the LBS acts maliciously. More realistic scenarios could of course be 
better characterized by more complex probability models. Finally, our privacy analysis focuses only on 
queries, rather than replies, due to the similarity of the alternative analysis. 
Privacy is not completely compromised as long as a list of queries contains at least one query in addition 
to the user's. Provided that users in the first column of the trellis of Sec. 2.2 submit forged queries, any group 
of colluding users will be unable to ascertain authentic queries, at least without further statistical analysis. 
For j>1, consider the case when user (i,j)'s query is known to a group of users colluding with each other 
and the LBS. The probability that this situation is guaranteed to happen regardless of how query lists are split 
and transmitted, requires collusion of the 2m users in columns j-1 and j+1, or merely the m users in column j-
1 if j=n. This probability of guaranteed complete privacy breach (GCPB) is pGCPB=(1-t)
2m
 for 1<j<n, and (1-
t)
m 
for j=n. By definition pGCPB is a probability conditioned on the event that the LBS acts maliciously, in 
cooperation with the group of colluding users.  
It is shown in [9] that under the mild assumption of symmetry and random query forwarding, the 
probability of coincidental complete privacy breach (CCPB) is, for 1<j<n, 
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The same work proves the approximation for t≈1 
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3.2 Network cost 
Regarding network costs, [9] shows that the number of connections and query messages which are required 
by our protocol in the m-by-n trellis is O(m
2
n), and the total number of queries transmitted through the trellis 
is O(m n
2
). Relative to the minimum of m n attained in an ideal scenario with benign participants, the 
corresponding overhead is linear, precisely, O(m) and O(n) respectively. Provided that users in the first 
column generate a fixed number of queries, the total number of queries processed by the LBS is O(m n), and 
the relative overhead is asymptotically 1. In [9] we describe simple variations of the protocol to remove the 
need for forged query processing altogether. In addition, the privacy protocol is completely transparent to the 
implementation of the query-response function in the LBS. This is an advantage with respect to 
cryptographic PIR mechanisms operating on the assumption of a reduced response space, for instance, a 
lookup table implementation of the query-response function. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY 
We simulated two query forwarding policies for the trellis structure described in Sec. 2.3, using the Monte 
Carlo technique. In the first policy users randomly forward the queries that arrive to them from the previous 
column. In the second policy users spread queries as much as possible. It can be seen in Fig. 6. that lower 
probabilities of privacy risk are obtained by spreading. After simulation of the mentioned policies, it can be 
seen that as t increases, the spreading policy further reduces the probability regardless of the variation of m, j 
and f. The probability is reduced drastically as m increases but not as significantly with f when the trust 
probability of users is high. Furthermore, it can be considered that probabilities obtained with random 
forwarding policy are close to the theoretical probability of CCPB of equation (1), unlike maximum 
spreading policy, which is considerably lower.  
The following plots show averages of 10 000 simulated outcomes. When the experimental result is far 
from the theoretical probability, it means that the number of simulated outcomes yields insufficiently 
accurate averages. As a consequence, if the simulation with random forwarding is not accurate, neither will 
be the simulation with spread forwarding. 
As for the graphic representation of the theoretical probability, the plots of Fig. 6 also suggest that larger 
m and f help reduce pCCPB, in keeping with the exact formula (1). For trustworthy users, pCCPB decreases 
exponentially with j and f, but approaches a saturation level for large m. This phenomenon is supported by 
the curves depicted for t=9/10 in Fig. 6. The intraquery splitting alternative commented on in Sec. 2.2 may be 
an additional degree of freedom in the protocol to alter the probability of CCPB, but the probability of GCPB 
will remain equal to (1-t)
2m
. While both probabilities can always be reduced by generating additional forged 
queries at intermediate nodes, this comes at the cost of network traffic, and LBS processing time. 
 
  
(a) m=5, j=5, f=4  (b) m=1,…,10, j=5, f=4 
 
(c) m=5, j=2,…,10, f=4  (d) m=5, j=5, f=1,…,10 
Fig. 6. Probability of CCPB(1), and simulation of the protocol with random forwarding and maximum spread forwarding. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Location-based services are undoubtedly essential representatives of the ICTs. Due to their inherent 
capability to infer private information from LBSs users, techniques to protect the user privacy are of 
paramount importance. In this work, we have proposed a collaborative privacy protocol for LBSs that despite 
not requiring TTPs, is highly scalable in terms of privacy risk. Precisely, one of the main strengths of the 
protocol is that it benefits from an exponentially decreasing probability of guaranteed privacy breach, at the 
expense of only linearly increasing relative communication costs, with respect to the size parameters of the 
trellis.  
More specifically, users group themselves into a trellis of m rows and n columns, where queries are 
exchanged and permuted in such a way that privacy is preserved throughout to a scalable degree. In fact, 
complete privacy breach is only guaranteed under the collusion of 2m users together with the LBS, 
increasingly unlikely with large m. There exists a tradeoff between privacy and latency, due to the fact that 
users must wait for others to cooperate before sending their queries, and that a latency constraint in turn 
imposes an upper bound on the average number of participants in the trellis. Creating and maintaining the ad 
hoc network structure needed by our protocol has been shown to be feasible with a small number of nodes 
and sufficient for practical applications. 
Furthermore, the probability was simulated following two policies. First, forwarding queries to the next 
column randomly, and secondly, spreading them as much as possible. The Monte Carlo simulation concluded 
that spreading leads to lower probabilities of privacy risk. It can be seen that as t (trust probability) increases, 
the spreading policy further reduces the probability regardless of the variation of m (number of users in a 
row), j (user column index) and f (number of queries sent by a user of the first column). The probability is 
reduced drastically as m increases. However, the dependence of the probability is not as significant on f, 
especially for high values of t. Furthermore, it can be considered that probabilities obtained with random 
forwarding policy are close to the theoretical probability of CCPB, unlike maximum spreading policy, which 
is considerably lower.  
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